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Abstract
In the same manner as the Third Reich, Islamic State (is) uses law, terror and propa-
ganda as ‘techniques of governance’ that serve to advance their political aims: securing 
themselves in power, preparing and waging war, and fostering the idea of an Islamic 
state. is have successfully used print and radio media systematically for the dissemina-
tion of lethal ideas and for the mobilization of the population on a grand scale in order 
to materialise these ideas. When such propaganda is laced with the dolus specialis of 
the crime of genocide, the severity of the mass action it brings about can be disastrous. 
This article analyses the hate propaganda used in the online publications of is. 
Evidence will then bring to light the fact that their hate propaganda amounts to direct 
and public incitement of others to commit genocide and the propagandists could, 
thus, be prosecuted for this crime at national or international courts.
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1 This is how Hitler addressed the method of propaganda in Mein Kampf as quoted in ‘The 
Unfounded Acquittal of Defendant Fritsche’, from ‘Dissenting Opinion of the Soviet Member 
of the International Military Tribunal, Major General Jurisprudence I.T. Nikitchenko on the 
Judgment concerning defendants Schaht, von Papen, Fritzche and Hess and the accused 
organisations Reichscabinet and owk, Trial of the Major War Criminals by the International 
Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany (Williams S. Hein & Co., New York, 2001) 138–
140. See also Serge Chakotin, The Rape of the Masses: The Psychology of Totalitarian Political 
Propaganda (George Routledge & Sons, London, 1940) 128–159 discussing the secret of Hitler’s 
success and his use of ‘popular emotional propaganda’ and ‘propaganda by persuasion’.
2 Predrag Dojčinović (ed.), Propaganda, War Crimes Trials and International Law: From 
Speakers’ Corner to War Crimes (Routledge, London, 2012) 5.
3 Ibid. See also Stanley B. Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda: A Reconstruction (Westport, 
CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002). Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze (ictr-99-52-t) 
Trial Judgment, 3 December 2003, para.1027: ‘Where there is war, there is war, and Propaganda 
is part of it’.
4 Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The formation of Men’s Attitudes (Vintage Books, New York, 1973) 190.
1 Introduction
With the help of a skilful and continuous application of propaganda it is 
possible to make the people conceive even of heaven as hell and also 
make them consider heavenly the most miserly existence.1
Propaganda, the etymology of which stems from the Latin root meaning ‘to 
sow’ or to ‘spread out’, is a primary method of cognitive conditioning, which 
has the power to distil an ideal into the human mind, in order to influence or 
control their future actions.2 The components which form the building blocks 
of propaganda are the concepts of brainwashing, distortion and persuasion 
rendering it an extremely powerful tool in time of conflicts.3 This primary 
method of warfare is defined as ‘a set of methods employed by an organised 
group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions 
of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manip-
ulations and incorporated in an organisation’.4
The severity of bringing about the massive participation of the population 
in mass action falls under its most dangerous guise when the intent of the pro-
pagandist is laced with the dolus specialis of the crime of genocide. There is an 
abundance of historical evidence to support this notion (for example, the Nazi 
and Rwandan genocides), all of which highlight the ability of relentless propa-
ganda in terms of creating a poisonous atmosphere in society, which allows for 
genocide to flourish. This article will analyse the hate propaganda used within 
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5 The main focus of the present article will be on the jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda vis-à-vis the crime of direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide.
6 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, (Adopted by Resolution 260 (iii) A of the unga on 9 December 1948), Article 1: 
‘The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time 
of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish’.
7 United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed 
Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015, reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
UNAMI-O H C H R _%20POC%20Report_FINAL_01%20May-31%20October%202015 
_FINAL_11Jan2016.pdf, 20 January 2016. For more information on the rising civilian death toll
the so-called Islamic State (is) online publications and radio broadcasts. As is 
hate propaganda is infused with primitive Islamic discourse, this analysis will 
pay specific attention to key terms and labels such as kafir (unbeliever) and is’s 
wide practice of takfīr (excommunication) in their cultural and linguistic con-
texts. Evidence will then bring to light the fact that their hate propaganda 
amounts to direct and public incitement of others to commit genocide, and 
the propagandists could, thus, be prosecuted for this crime before national or 
international courts.
The international community witnessed the devastatingly far-reaching 
effects of genocidal propaganda through publications such as Der Stürmer in 
Nazi Germany and Kangura in Rwanda, which, combined with many other 
explicit and implicit forms of incitement, saw the combined deaths of millions 
of innocent people. The jurisprudence from both the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremburg (imt) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ictr) provide an insight into the conceptual background of propa-
ganda with regard to inciting genocide.5 This is fundamental in the contempo-
rary context as there is a lesson to be learned from Rwanda in terms of genocide 
prevention. Hypothetically speaking, if a situation were to arise where hate 
speech and propaganda were being used to incite genocide in the present day, 
such propaganda should be identified as amounting to the crime of direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide. As such, the predominant objective of 
the Genocide Convention could be fulfilled.6
Yet at the time of writing, the Middle East has spiralled into a frenzy of cata-
strophic proportions as the rise of is has seen the systematic targeting of eth-
nic and religious communities in areas subject to its control namely, Syria, Iraq 
and the neighbouring States. This has led to the mass exodus of the Yazidis, 
Christians, Shi‘a Muslims and members of other ethnic and religious groups in 
which 3.2 million people have been internally displaced and 18,802 killed in 
Iraq in between January 2014 and 31 October 2015.7 In its latest publication, 
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 see unga, Technical assistance provided to assist in the promotion and protection of human 
rights in Iraq, (27 July 2015) un Doc (a/hrc/30/66), www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_hrc_30_66.pdf, 11 Decem ber 
2015; United Nations General Assembly (unga), Report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Iraq in light of abuses 
committed by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Associated Groups, 
(27 March 2015) un Doc (a/hrc/28/18), 3, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Regular 
Sessions/Session28/Pages/ListReports.aspx, accessed 8 December 2015.
8 United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the 
Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015, ibid.
9 Mr. Ján Kubiš, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Iraq, 5 
January 2016, Baghdad. See also: Mr. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 5 January 2016, Geneva, quoted in United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Iraq, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in 
Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015, ibid.
10 unga, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human 
rights situation in Iraq in light of abuses committed by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and 
the Levant and associated groups (27 March 2015) un Doc (a/hrc/28/18), 6.
11 Ibid.
the Human Rights Council of the United Nations has acknowledged that 
the widespread and systematic actions of is may amount to the crime of 
genocide.8 As a result, the special representative of the United Nations 
Secretary-General in Iraq and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights have emphasised the need to hold the perpetrators accountable 
under international law.9
is has embarked on a war path of religious extermination as its members 
pursue the purification of Islam in order to subject the world to their jīhadī-
Salafi doctrine. Numerous Yazidi witnesses have provided credible and consis-
tent accounts detailing how they were forced to convert to Islam or face death. 
Since is entered Iraq in January 2014, the Yazidi death toll is estimated to be in 
the thousands while 3000 people currently remain in is captivity.10 The major-
ity of this death toll is made up of men, whilst women and children are subject 
to sexual and gender-based violence, highlighting a clear pattern of wide-
spread and systematic enslavement, rape, and sexual slavery. Credible reports 
provide evidence of rape against girls as young as 6 years old and the forcible 
transfer of children spanning over both Iraq and Syria, while reports have 
shown that suicides and attempted suicides have sharply risen amongst 
women and girls who have managed to survive such atrocities.11 In light of this, 
there are reasonable grounds to suggest that genocide is taking place in the 
 5The Road to Genocide




12 Elliot Friedland, ‘Hilary Clinton: isis is Committing Genocide’ (Clarion Project, 30 Decem-
ber 2015) www.clarionproject.org/analysis/hillary-clinton-isis-committing- genocide, 
accessed 7 January 2016.
13 Daniel Milto, ‘The Islamic State: An Adaptive Organization Facing Increasing Challenges’, 
The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the 
Islamic State, (The Combatting Terrorism Centre at West Point, December 2014) 47 www.
ctc.usma.edu, accessed 10 December 2015.
contemporary world, yet the international community is hesitant to declare 
such a concrete classification.12
This article focuses on the crime of direct and public incitement of others to 
commit genocide in relation to is and their widespread and systematic propa-
ganda machine. After a brief introduction to the media arm of is, the article 
examines the substantive law underpinning the crime of incitement to geno-
cide, drawing reference mainly from the jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ictr), which sets a precedent in clarifying and 
extending the concept of incitement to genocide. Since the law surrounding 
the crime is somewhat complex in relation to its substantive application the 
article shall provide a clear view of the law in action. This shall highlight the 
pivotal role hate propaganda plays in the build up to incitement. Applying this 
reference tool, this article will then examine and analyse the hate propaganda 
used throughout Dābiq, the online publication at the forefront of is propa-
ganda, as well as their radio broadcast medium, al-Bayan. As is’s hate propa-
ganda is permeated with primitive Islamic discourse, our analysis will pay 
specific attention to key terms such as takfīr (excommunication) and kufr (dis-
belief in Allah) in light of their cultural and linguistic context. The two-tiered 
ideology to which is adheres is also explained. Thus, evidence will highlight 
the fact that their hate propaganda has created a toxic climate which has 
opened the door to the realisation of incitement to commit genocide as a 
crime under international law.
2 The Media Arm of is
The propaganda machine at the forefront of is artillery is comprised of a 
robust, multi-level organisational structure designed to exercise central con-
trol over the terrorist groups’ external messaging, while also harvesting impor-
tant content from different geographic areas of its operations.13 Their media 
proficiency exists because of an extensive media infrastructure that allows it to 
produce high-quality, timely products in different languages for different 
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14 Ibid. See also recent study conducted by Charlie Winter, ‘The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: 
Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy’ (Qulliam Foundation, July 2015), 
www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-
caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf.
15 One scholar’s review of aq’s media apparatus noted that Zarqawi was already taking the 
media side of terrorism to new levels. See Philip Seib, ‘The Al-Qaeda Media Machine’, 88 
Military Review (2008) 75. By noting the historical precedent of aqi/isI’s media opera-
tions, the savvy and sophistication shown by is is much less surprising. All the media side 
of the organization has done is built on its successes and continue to refine its products. 
The speed and volume of what is being produced by is is perhaps more surprising than 
the quality of the product.
16 United Nations Office on Drug and Crime, The Use of the Internet for terrorist purposes 
September 2012 (13 October 2014), www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_
Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf, accessed 14 December 2015.
17 Abu Bakr Naji, ‘The Management of Savagery’, translated by Will McCants (John M. Olin 
Institute for Strategic Studies: Harvard, 2006) 17.
18 Ibid.
19 Winter, supra note 13, 12.
20 Ibid., ‘is has its own media unit for nashīds, Mu’assasat Ajnād, or the Ajnād Foundation. 
These songs regularly form the backing music for is’ video propaganda. Less regular, more 
carefully produced content emerges from one of is’ three centralised propaganda units: 
Mu’assasat al-Furqān, Mu’assasat al-I’tiṣām, or Markaz al-Ḥayāt l-il-I’lām. The alFurqān 
Foundation also delivers official statements from the organisation’s leadership’.
audiences that fit the narrative that the group wishes to convey.14 This revolu-
tionary system stems back several years, when the previous guise of is, the 
Islamic State in Iraq (isI), created a multi-tiered environment that introduced 
structure into the group’s media operations.15 It is this structure which is has 
gone on to innovate and utilise as their prolific ideological propaganda is com-
municated extraterritorially to a limitless audience.16
Among the most prominent influences upon is’s ideology and practices, is a 
book written by a jīhadīst strategist17 in which the author speaks extensively 
about the West’s manipulation of a ‘deceptive media halo’, a carefully managed 
media image that creates a feeling of invincibility, a feeling that ‘it is an all-
encompassing, overwhelming power and [that] people are subservient to it not 
only through fear, but also through love because it spreads freedom, justice, 
equality among humanity, and various other slogans’.18 The full body of is propa-
ganda is vast on an unprecedented scale. It is estimated that an average of three 
videos and more than fifteen photographic reports are circulated per day.19 Their 
propaganda utilises digital publications, radio broadcasts, online videos and 
audio statements, nashīds (jīhadīst music sung a cappella) and feature-length 
films that depict their most barbarous acts, which emerge on a monthly basis.20
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22 Milto, supra note 13, p. 48–49.
23 Dojčinović, supra note 2.
The Ministry of Media (mom) is the central hub for the creation and distribu-
tion of official is content and is made up of four different components: 
al-Furqān, al-Hayāt, al-I‘tisam, and Ajnād Foundation (see Fig. 1). Each wilāyah 
(province) within is-controlled territories has its own regional media bureau, 
all of which have partial autonomy to produce and distribute their own con-
tent, however approval is often required from the mom.22 This is an essential 
component when analysing who is to be held accountable for the crime of 
incitement.
Most notably, religious propaganda is one of the most successful formulae 
applied to the human mind as it is composed of the power to communicate 
with people in all corners of the world, messages of comfort, hope and salva-
tion juxtaposed with conversion, conquest and combat.23 The prominent use 
and availability of social media has created a new window of opportunity 
which allows the poisonous and the distorted religious message of is to spread 
and flourish globally. is push their narrative through a number of mediums 
ranging from the internet, broadcast airwaves, traditional publications and 
video recordings in public parks and squares. In June 2014, is started the 
Figure 1 The propaganda outlet of is21
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24 Harleen Gambhir, ‘isis Global Intelligence Summary March 1 – May 7 2015’ (Institute for 
the Study of War, 2015) http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/INTSUM_
Summary_update.pdf, accessed 15 December 2015.
25 Lucas Tomlinson, ‘Welcome to Islamic State tv: us officials battle to counter ‘slick’ isis 
media arm,’ Fox News, 11 October 2014.
26 Dojčinović, supra note 2.
27 Ibid., see also Terrance W. Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and 
the Brain (W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 1997).
28 Ellul, supra note 4, 59.
29 Predrag Dojčinović,‘Word Scene Investigations: toward a cognitive linguistic approach to 
the criminal analysis of open source evidence in war crimes cases’, Dojčinović supra 
note 2, 72.
al-Bayan radio station in Mosul.24 Since its inception, it has been broadcasting 
readings of the Qur’ān, lectures, and battlefield updates. They also control sev-
eral tv stations in Iraq and Syria.25 In addition to this, they began to publish a 
high-quality English language publication called Islamic State News (and later 
Islamic State Report), which glorified their initiative through descriptions of 
their battles and key policies. The publications were brief and relied on graph-
ics to magnify their narrative. However, the first issue of Dābiq was released in 
early July 2014; a glossy in-depth propaganda magazine with unprecedented 
digital reach. The magazine coincided the declaration of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
appointment as Caliph, and has been released on a monthly basis ever since. It 
is this medium of propaganda which will provide the primary source of ana-
lytical content necessary to satisfy the elements of direct and public incite-
ment to commit genocide. In combination with the constant flow of broadcasts 
from al-Bayan and statements from online video footage, there is a surplus of 
evidence which meets the necessary grounds of the prerequisite hate speech 
and linguistic content amounting to incitement. As such, evaluating said con-
tent is absolutely paramount.
Across all spheres, propaganda finds its most influential form when cre-
atively implemented.26 This embellishment appeals to the human brain, an 
engine naturally designed for the processing and exchange of symbolic opera-
tions on a rather complex and personal level.27 To ignore the substantial influ-
ence of is propaganda in light of the already occurring incitement to commit 
genocide would be both negligent and reckless. Especially given that the inter-
national community has paid witness to events of a similar nature only two 
decades before.
Propaganda is necessarily a declaration of ones intentions28 and the pat-
terns which emerge from the propagandists’ conduct can reveal or at least 
indicate the intent hidden behind an entire propaganda mechanism.29 It is 
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30 Prosecutor v. Akayesu (ictr-96-4-t) Trial Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 559. 
See Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze, supra note 3, paras. 1011–15. Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli 
(ictr-98-44a-t) Trial Judgment, 1 December 2003 paras. 850–855. See also Prosecutor 
v. Niyitegeka (ictr-96-14-t) Trial Judgment, 16 May 2003, para. 431.
31 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze (ictr-99-52-a) Appeals Judgment, 
28 November 2007, para. 677. See also Prosecutor v. Bikindi (ictr-01-72-t) Trial Judgment, 
2 December 2008, para. 419.
32 Prosecutor v. Serugendo (ictr-2005-84-i) Trial Judgment, 12 June 2006, para. 9. See also 
Prosecutor v. Muvunyi (ictr-2000-55a-t) Trial Judgment, 12 September 2006, para. 466.
through an analysis of the configuration of linguistics, that the genocidal 
intent of is shall be revealed. With this in mind, the following section discusses 
the substantive law of the crime of direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide based on the jurisprudence of the ictr. The article shall then anal-
yse the relevant content taken from the primary propaganda sources of is in 
an attempt to bring to light the perpetrators dolus specialis, whilst satisfying 
the actus reus of direct and public incitement.
3 Elements of Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide
The ictr’s judgement in the Akayesu case was the first instance in which an 
international tribunal considered the crime of direct and public incitement as 
a specific offence. Considering both the common law and civil law traditions, 
the Trial Chamber concluded that under the Genocide Convention and Article 
2(3)(c) of the Statute of the ictr, direct and public incitement means:
Directly provoking the perpetrator(s) to commit genocide, whether 
through speeches, shouting or threats uttered in public places and at 
public gatherings, or through the sale or dissemination, offer for sale of 
display of written or printed matter in public places or at public gather-
ings, or through the public display of placards or posters, or through any 
other means of audio-visual communication.30
In order to secure a conviction of such a crime the prosecution has to establish 
the actus reus, directly and publicly incitement to commit genocide, and the 
mens rea, the intent to directly and publicly bring about such incitement.31 As 
such, the crux lies in whether the incitement is both direct and public, and if 
the accused had the specific intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, 
ethnic, racial or religious group through their incitement.32 Through analysis 
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33 Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, ibid., para. 502.
34 Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, supra note 30, para. 852. See also Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, supra note 
30, para. 43; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 30, para. 557. un Doc., Report on the 
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth, 6 May – 26 July, (A/51/10), p.26.
35 Prosecutor v. Bikindi, supra note 31, paras. 422–424.
36 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze, supra note 31, paras. 698, 700–703.
37 Ibid., paras. 698, 700–703.
38 Ibid.
of the jurisprudence of the ictr, a precedential set of guidelines has emerged 
which may be used in order to aid future investigations into allegations of the 
crime of incitement. In order to apply said guidelines to is propaganda, the 
following section summarises the substantive law underpinning the judg-
ments of the ictr.
3.1 Direct
The direct element requires more than a vague or indirect suggestion of incite-
ment, and states that the expression which is alleged to incite, should specifi-
cally provoke another to engage in criminal conduct.33 Such engagement 
resulting from provocation must urge the individual to take ‘immediate’ 
action.34 For instance, in the Bikindi case, the Trial Chamber found that 
Bikindi’s call on ‘the majority’ to ‘rise up and look everywhere possible’ and not 
to ‘spare anybody’, immediately referring to the Tutsi as the minority, unequiv-
ocally constituted a direct call to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group.35 However, 
identifying the direct element of the offence is more complex than it first 
appears. Several complexities arise in relation to the language of the discourse, 
as well as, the social, historical, political and cultural environment surrounding 
it. The principal consideration is, thus, the meaning of the words used in the 
specific context. It does not matter that the message may appear ambiguous to 
another audience or in another context.36
In the Media case, the Appeals Chamber agreed with the Akayesu Trial 
Chamber where the latter considered it necessary to take account of Rwanda’s 
culture and language in determining whether speech constituted direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide. Hence, the nuances of the Kinyarwanda 
language had to be taken into consideration to understand how the intended 
audience understood the speech.37 This point is essential in relation to the pro-
paganda used by is, whose discourse relies heavily on Islamic references. If the 
discourse is still ambiguous even when considered in context, it cannot be 
found beyond reasonable doubt to constitute direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide.38 In the present case, it would be open for the Trial Chamber 
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<UN>
39401234
39 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze, supra note 31, para. 713. ‘The Appeals 
Chamber recognises that the political affiliation of the author of the speech may be 
regarded as a contextual element which can assist in its interpretation.’
40 Prosecutor v. Bikindi, supra note 31, para. 387. See also Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, supra note 32, 
para. 502; Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze, supra note 3, para. 1011.
41 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze, supra note 31, para. 739.
42 Ibid.
43 Prosecutor v. Bikindi, supra note 31, paras. 247–50.
44 William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2009) 319. See also Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, supra note 32, para. 503.
to prove that the discourse still met the direct element in a particular context. 
In this instance, the following must be considered: cultural and linguistic con-
text, the political and community affiliations of the author,39 and whether the 
audience understood its implications i.e. a direct appeal to genocide may be 
implicit, it need not explicitly call for extermination but could nonetheless 
constitute a call which resonates with the intended subjects.40 The Appeals 
Chamber was of the opinion that it was reasonable for the Trial Chamber to 
conclude that the derogatory terms ‘Inyenzi’ and ‘Inkotanyi’ referred to the 
Tutsi population as a whole, even though they have various meanings in differ-
ent languages and contexts.41 It concluded that the Trial Chamber was correct 
in finding certain rtlm broadcasts had directly equated the Tutsi with the 
enemy, the result of which permitted extermination of the Tutsi population.42
Analysing the discourse in light of the historical context is also an essential 
factor to consider. For instance, the ictr had to consider the ethnic division 
which had existed in Rwanda during the second half of the 20th century and 
the political tension this caused when analysing how the audience would 
understand speech in light of such events.43 This is essential when analysing is 
propaganda specifically targeting Shi‘a Muslims. A person oblivious to the his-
tory of Islam will not be aware of the long-standing sectarian divide between 
the Sunni and Shi‘a. Appropriately, analysing is discourse in light of this divide 
is essential when establishing how Sunni Muslims understand the implica-
tions of hate speech aimed at the Shi‘a.
3.2 Public
There is a general consensus that the drafters of the Genocide Convention only 
intended to criminalise public incitement and to rule out private forms. 
Incitement in the private sense is only punishable if the underlying crime of 
genocide occurs, whereas incitement in public can be prosecuted even where 
genocide does not take place.44 Whether incitement is public is evaluated 
on two factors: ‘The place where incitement occurred and whether or not 
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45 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 30, para. 556.
46 Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, supra note 30, para. 851
47 un Doc., International Law Commission’s Report on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session at 
Geneva, Switzerland, 6 May – 26 July, (A/51/10), p. 26; Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, supra note 
30, para. 431; Prosecutor v. Ruggiu (ictr-97-32-i), Trial Judgment, 1 June 2001, para. 17.
48 For an analysis on the causal link see Richard Ashby Wilson, ‘Inciting Genocide with 
Words’, 36 Michigan Journal of International Law (2015) 277–320; Joshua Wallenstein, 
‘Punishing Words: An Analysis of the Necessity of the Elements of Causation in 
Prosecutions for Incitement to Genocide’ 54 Stanford Law Review (2001) 351–398.
49 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) 
445: ‘The word inchoate denotes something that has just begun or is under developed’.
50 Schabas, supra note 44, 319; see also Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze, supra 
note 31, para. 766. ‘The Appeals Chamber summarily dismisses Appellant Ngeze’s argu-
ment…..because it is not necessary to show that direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide was followed by any actual consequence’; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 30, 
para. 562; Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, supra note 47, para. 16; Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, supra note 
30, para. 431.
51 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 22. 
See Wibke Kristin Timmermann, ‘The Relationship between Hate Propaganda and 
Incitement to Genocide: A New Trend in International Law towards Criminalising Hate 
Propaganda?’, 18 Leiden Journal of International Law (2005) 257–282, 274.
assistance was selective or limited’.45 There is no absolute requirement that the 
inciting discourse be carried through a specific medium or to a specified num-
ber of people, however both the number and the medium act as key indicators 
in finding that the incitement was public.46 Establishing the public element is 
relatively self-evident. For instance, in civil law systems words are public when 
they are spoken out loud in a place that is public by definition. As such, the 
International Law Commission characterised public incitement by ‘a call for 
criminal action to a number of individuals in a public place or to members of 
the public at large by such means as mass media’.47
The importance of identifying public incitement is fundamental in the 
sense that the incitement need not be successful in order to find the perpetra-
tor guilty.48 The much debated topic as to the requirement of a causal relation-
ship between incitement and the underlying crime is superseded by the nature 
of the crime.49 In specifying a distinct act of direct and public incitement, the 
drafters of the Genocide Convention sought to create an autonomous infrac-
tion, one that, like conspiracy, is an inchoate offence, in that the prosecution 
need not make proof of any result.50 The criminalisation of incitement to 
genocide in international law, as an inchoate crime, reflects one of the funda-
mental purposes of international criminal law, namely to criminalise ‘conduct 
creating an unacceptable risk of harm’.51 The argument that direct and public 
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Review of The Red Cross (2006) 864, 825.
55 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze, supra note 31, paras. 720–723.
incitement is a continuous offence, in the sense that if committed before the 
temporal jurisdiction of a court the offence may be prolonged into the period 
over which the tribunal has jurisdiction is not compatible with the inchoate 
nature of the crime and has been rejected by the Appeals Chamber of the 
ictr.52 A continuing crime implies ongoing activity.53 However, an inchoate 
offence is effective from the moment it is uttered or published.54 The effects of 
the crime may extend in time – and this can be used in order to establish a 
perpetrators future incitement – yet direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide is completed as soon as the discourse satisfies the elements of the 
crime.55 Therefore, genocide falls under the category of crimes so serious, 
direct and public incitement to commit such a crime warrants the punishment 
of the perpetrator regardless of its success.
3.3 Mens Rea
The Akayesu Trial Chamber explained the mental element required for direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide as follows:
The mens rea required for the crime of direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide lies in the intent to directly prompt or provoke another 
to commit genocide. It implies a desire on the part of the perpetrator to 
create by his actions a particular state of mind necessary to commit such 
a crime in the minds of the person(s) he is so engaging. That is to say that 
the person who is inciting to commit genocide must himself have the 
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specific intent to commit genocide, namely, to destroy in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such.56
To aid a finding of the mens rea of the direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide one must evaluate the context of the media. The language used has 
often been cited as an indicator of intent.57 However, it is important to note the 
actual occurrence of genocide must not be solely relied upon to show intent to 
incite. A key indicator here will be the distance between the incitement and 
the occurrence of genocide. The longer the gap in between, the more contrib-
uting factors may come into play.58 In the Muvunyi case, the Trial Chamber 
found that
at a meeting held at Gikonko [in Mugusa Commune] in April or May 1994, 
the Accused addressed a crowd of Hutu male civilians during which he 
equated Tutsis to ‘snakes’ that should be killed. The Chamber was satis-
fied that Muvunyi knew that his audience immediately understood 
the genocidal implication of his words and therefore had the requisite 
intent to destroy members of the Tutsi ethnic group in whole or in part as 
such.59
Through an analysis of the language used in is propaganda, the genocidal 
intent shall be revealed. Before going on to conduct such analysis, this article 
shall first discuss the crucial role hate speech plays as a prerequisite to the 
crime of genocide.
4 Hate Speech: The Shadow of Incitement
As the fundamental purpose of this article is to aid in prosecuting and adjudi-
cating is for the perpetration of incitement to genocide, this article refrains 
from entering into the informed debate between the freedom of expression 
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and its relationship to hate speech. It is important to note that while there is a 
right to freedom of expression under customary international law,60 this right 
is not absolute. It is restricted by the very same conventions and international 
instruments that provide for it.61 That being said, whilst refraining from voic-
ing an opinion on the criminalisation of hate speech and the right to respect 
the freedom of expression, this article is ultimately concerned with the pivotal 
role hate speech plays as a prerequisite to the crime of incitement. Appropriately, 
an analysis is made of the correlation of the two concepts. It will also distin-
guish between the two which will aid the prosecution in establishing when 
hate speech crosses into the realms of incitement. Just as the crime of geno-
cide relies on incitement to rally its perpetrators into action, incitement relies 
on hate speech in order to create a climate in which its poisonous message can 
flourish.62 This view is encompassed within the precedent set by the ictr.63
The danger of hate propaganda becomes evidently clear when analysing 
the crucial role it played in both the Nazi and Rwandan genocide. Extensive 
hate propaganda sets into motion a continuum of destruction by devaluing 
and dehumanizing the victim group.64 This form of psychological preparation 
lays a seed of hate and implants in people’s mind the idea that the extermina-
tion of a certain group of people is not just acceptable, but also necessary.65 In 
this sense, one could argue that hate propaganda is itself as dangerous as 
incitement due to the climate it creates.66 In the lead up to genocide, hate 
propaganda sets the stage whilst incitement acts as the catalyst. Incitement 
calls for immediate action whereas hate propaganda is more subtle. It subcon-
sciously infiltrates the mind with reasoning which is later used to justify the 
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perpetration of the incited crime. It was this method of psychological manipu-
lation which caused ordinary people in Rwanda to commit such heinous and 
unthinkable crimes against their neighbours. Scholarly research has shown 
that ‘under particular circumstances most people have the capacity for 
extreme violence and the destruction of human life’.67 As a result, the peril lies 
in the creation of the circumstance. This is evident in the fact that genocide is 
not an act of spontaneity, rather a pre-planned and mass-coordinated act 
requiring an extremely large number of participants.
Hate propaganda comprises two methods of manipulation which make it so 
effective: the first being the verbal and visual technique for making a message 
persuasive, and the second frames the substance or theme of the message.68 
Encompassed within this are six common techniques:
1. stereotyping and labelling;
2. generalisation;
3. testimonial, i.e., god, history, experts are on our side and support us;
4. vox populi, vox dei, i.e., everyone is in favour of our program, everybody is 
joining our bandwagon;
5. repetition;
6. falsehood and lies.69
This is a process of social conditioning which gradually, but radically, changes 
norms of thought and behaviour.70 For instance, in Nazi Germany and Rwanda, 
both Nazi and Hutu extremists had to transform the normative environment 
so as to create an enemy and to justify actions considered verboten (killing 
one’s neighbour), as not only legitimate, but imperative.71 Genocide scholar 
Helen Fein explains this justification by stating that people can learn to  commit 
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these atrocities against other people by re-categorising them as ‘outside the 
universe of moral obligation’.72 For instance, Julius Streicher, the editor and 
publisher of Der Stürmer, depicted the Jew as ‘a parasite, an enemy, an evil-
doer, a disseminator of disease who must be destroyed in the interest of man-
kind’.73 The Hutu leaders repetitively and consistently referred to the Tutsi 
population as ‘Inyenzi’ (cockroach),74 and Slobodan Milošević referred to 
Bosnian Muslims as ‘black crows’.75
It is essential to avoid underestimating the role of hate propaganda as a pre-
requisite of incitement to genocide. The propaganda itself is used as a mecha-
nism to subliminally place the concept of hatred in the mind of the audience. 
The subliminal message is repeated in such a consistent manner that it 
becomes an inherent thought process of the subject. When this is combined 
with a collective justification for mass atrocities, the subject’s morality becomes 
overridden with callous thought. It is during this process that incitement 
thrives. As such, viewing hate propaganda in this light is fundamental for the 
prosecution in proving the crime of direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide.
Consequently, if evidence is provided which highlights is’s utility of the six 
common techniques (mentioned above), this will provide an insight into 
how their target audience perceives their incitement. For instance, if is have 
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distilled hatred and animosity into the subconscious of their audience, an 
implicit or explicit call to violence has the potential to be received with assent. 
The crux being its implications will be understood and thus, may satisfy the 
crime’s direct element. In contrast, a call to extermination would be met with 
objection and extreme controversy if it had not been previously justified. This 
was repeatedly and unambiguously recognised by the ictr who acknowl-
edged the inextricable link between hate propaganda and incitement in that 
hate propaganda represents a stage prior to incitement in the process leading 
up to the actual genocide.76
That being said, whilst identifying hate speech as a prerequisite to incite-
ment is crucial, there may come a time where a court has to draw a line between 
the two concepts. In order to aid in the interpretation of such a task, Susan 
Benesch77 has devised a reasonably possible consequence test consisting of a 
six-pronged enquiry which, when all six prongs are satisfied, acknowledges 
when hate speech may cross into the realm of incitement:
1. Was the speech understood by its audience as a call to commit genocide?
2. Was the speaker able to influence the audience, and was the audience 
able to commit genocide?
3. Had the target group suffered recent violence?
4. Was the market place of ideas still functioning?
5. Did the speaker dehumanise the target group and justify the killing?
6. Had the audience already received similar messages?
The test is advantageous in the sense that it provides an aid which helps to 
satisfy the elements encompassed within the legal existing standard of direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide. It also recognises the role of hate 
speech (see points 5 and 6) while providing a tool to distinguish between the 
two concepts. In order to satisfy the requisite elements of incitement, all six 
prongs must be met. When this is combined with evidence that the discourse 
was made publically, there may be sufficient grounds to believe the definitive 
elements of the crime are satisfied. However, if only a number of the prongs 
are met, the speech may fall into the category of hate propaganda and may be 
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used for future evidence. The crux lies with satisfying prong 1 once prongs 2–6 
have been met, as it is the call to take action which catapults hate speech over 
the threshold of incitement.
What is extremely important to note here is that this test is devised as a tool 
to aid a finding of incitement to commit genocide, on the grounds that it is in 
the fundamental public interest to correctly identify the crime where appro-
priate. It is not put forth as an intended replacement of the existing legal 
requirements of the crime.78 The test has been criticised on the basis that it 
assesses the likelihood that a speech act could have foreseeable genocidal con-
sequences and thus places reliance on the element of causation.79 Richard 
Wilson further argues that the test fails to acknowledge under what conditions 
a speech act would not constitute incitement to commit genocide, contending 
that the test is overly biased towards the prosecution, which is neither neutral 
nor objective.80 To fortify his argument he states that Benesch’s model aims to 
be predictive without providing a method of prediction.81 Concluding his criti-
cal analysis, Wilson asks, should we not be wary of convicting individuals of 
international speech crimes based upon a test of probability that is ill-defined, 
one that is as ambiguous as the jurisprudence of the ictr?82 Indeed, the 
answer to this question is yes. A conviction should not be made solely on this 
test alone. While the test is a guide for the prosecution, its fundamental objec-
tive is to shed light on whether the speech act potentially contains the requi-
site characteristics to meet the elements of the crime. It is not devised in order 
to give the prosecution an unfair advantage at being successful at trial. This 
article suggests a pragmatic approach which focuses on the test’s criteria as key 
indicators, which at most should be considered, to address whether the speech 
act may possess the characteristics of incitement. This is a process based on a 
number of contextual, social, political and environmental factors which at the 
same time recognises the prerequisite role of hate speech and encompasses 
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the latter as a fundamental part of the incitement process. Therefore, the test 
is not used here to establish the likelihood of genocide being caused. This arti-
cle acknowledges the legal consensus that incitement to commit genocide is 
inchoate and thus, is concerned with the linguistic content of a speech act, not 
its causal nexus. The criticisms cast on this test concerns the informed debate 
surrounding the ghost of causation. However, when the test is viewed with 
regard to the correlation between hate speech and incitement, it proves to be 
somewhat advantageous.
is’s turbulent rise to power became known globally throughout 2014 as they 
began to showcase their atrocities through their comprehensive media outputs. 
Over a year has passed since their first publication of Dābiq. Arguably, their hate 
propaganda amounting to the crime of direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide has had a year to spread into the social sphere. Once incitement is dis-
seminated into the public, its effect spreads rapidly and becomes impossible to 
control.83 Evidence of the efficiency of their propaganda can be seen from the 
thousands of foreign fighters from more than 90 countries who have performed 
hijrah (migration) to join the ranks of one of the deadliest radical religious 
groups in modern history.84 The longer incitement is allowed to continue, the 
greater the influence held over those incited; the less they are exposed to other 
influences, the greater the incitement’s effectiveness and the likelihood of 
criminal acts being committed as a result.85 In light of this, there is an urgent 
need to acknowledge is’s perpetration of the direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide. Through analytical scrutiny of their propaganda, the follow-
ing section shall attempt to provide sufficient evidence of this claim.
5 Propaganda in Action: Incitement to Commit Genocide
This section will provide an insight into the workings of Dābiq and Al-Bayan, 
the main media outlets of is. The second part of the present section will look 
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88 is Magazine, supra note 86.
at the Media case, which is the first time an international tribunal has dealt 
with similar propaganda and applied the elements of incitement to commit 
genocide to it. Our study will identify the main problems of this case in order 
to improve the application of the law in a potential case brought against is 
before the icc.
5.1 Sources of the is Propaganda Machine
The rapid development in technological resources, mass media and global 
communication has enabled is to merge archaic religious references with 
resources of modernity. In the second issue of their propaganda magazine: 
‘The Flood’, the metaphor of the story of Noah is used to put across a stark 
message: ‘you are either with the Islamic State or against them and doomed to 
be destroyed. It calls on all Muslims around the world to pledge loyalty to is 
and to move to their “Caliphate” immediately’. The same issue made it clear 
that the main aim of is ‘Media Centre is to convey the message of the Islamic 
State in different languages with the aim of unifying the Muslims under one 
flag’.86
5.1.1 Dābiq Online Magazine
Dābiq is a periodical magazine produced on a monthly basis with a predomi-
nant focus on the following: creedal values, honour and solidarity, the apoca-
lypse, the group’s objectives, establishing the caliphate, the enemy, end of 
humiliation, conduct, the nobility of jihad, the disgrace of their enemies, 
Prophetic methodology, group identity, the ummah (Muslim society), allies of 
Allah, takfīr/sectarianism, the underdog, quotations of Scripture, hadīth, the 
Qur’ān and scholarship.87 Encompassed within this publication is the personi-
fication of how is view themselves, boasting of their victories and painting a 
romantic image of the restoration of an Islamic golden age and the heralding 
of a ‘glorious’ new caliphate based on holy war (jihād).88
The title of the Dābiq magazine series is extremely significant due its sym-
bolic connotations. Dābiq is a small town in northern Aleppo, Syria, where, 
according to a well-known hadīth about Armageddon, Muslims and ‘Rome’ 
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91 is Magazine, Issue 1, ‘The Return of the Khilafah’, supra note 86.
92 is Magazine, Issue 2, ‘The Flood’, supra note 86: ‘Every time and place, those who are 
saved from the punishment are a small group whereas the majority are destroyed. Allah 
said: ‘It’s either me or the flood”.
(generally interpreted to mean the West) will clash.89 The location also has 
parallel historical significance as the site of a decisive battle in 1516 between 
the Ottomans and the Mamluks, which led to Ottoman victory and the consoli-
dation of the last recognized Islamic Caliphate.90 To reiterate the location’s 
importance, all thirteen of the magazine’s table of contents are preceded by a 
quote from the group’s founder Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi: ‘The spark has been lit 
here in Iraq, and its heart will continue to intensify — by Allah’s permission 
— until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq’. This chosen name symbolises 
the myth in Islam of the final apocalypse and the theme flowing through all 
thirteen publications stipulates ‘you are either with us or against us’. The latter 
encompasses all opposed to is (Muslim and non-Muslim) who will not be 
saved by Allah: ‘when the enemy of Allah sees him, he will melt as salt melts in 
water’.91 The title of the digital publication is extremely significant in the eyes 
of those who understand its theological implications. Yet to the uninformed 
eye it merely denotes to a small village in Syria one most may never have heard 
of. The group is telling Muslims that it is fulfilling this prophecy, enticing them 
to participate in one of the most important moments in world history. This 
metaphorically coincides with the group’s genocidal intent as it highlights 
their aim to eradicate everyone outside the realm of their Islamic belief, a 
vision which is embodied in their establishment of their utopian caliphate. 
This is made apparent in their second publication, ‘The Flood’, depicting the 
caliphate as the arc and anyone failing to join shall be wiped away.92 Referencing 
such events may appear somewhat absurd to those outside the realm of Islam, 
yet within the last decade polls have found that over half of Muslims surveyed, 
in nine Muslim majority countries around the world, believed that they would 
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live to see the start of the apocalypse.93 This highlights the importance of con-
ducting an analysis of the material thrust into the social sphere by is in light of 
how their intended audience understand its implications: ‘Indeed, fighting the 
kuffar [unbelievers], hijrah [migration], and jihād will remain until the estab-
lishment of the hour’.94
The organisation’s media strategists are producing high-definition depic-
tions of the most abhorrent brutality which features very graphic and powerful 
images of beheadings, the damage caused by Coalition-led airstrikes and the 
killings of mass civilians throughout their digital magazine. This wide broad-
cast of unvarnished violence is a deliberate process of blunting empathy, 
attracting individuals, frightening victims into compliance and projecting this 
activity to the outer world, juxtaposed with religious justification to depict a 
moralistic view through radicalisation and cognitive conditioning.95 It also 
provides us with a vast array of evidential content. Whilst the earlier publica-
tions contain a vast amount of hate speech which lacks an immediate call to 
take action,96 the later publications showcase suggestive speech acts evolving 
into actual incitement to commit genocide. This would appear to form part of 
a systematic pattern in order to desensitize its audience
5.1.2 Al-Bayan Radio Broadcast
Al-Bayan is the official radio station of is, aired in a news/talk format and 
broadcast in Arabic, Kurdish, English, French and Russian.97 Originating from 
Mosul, Iraq, al-Bayan programs have been credited with being ‘highly profes-
sional and slickly produced’ and have been compared to npr and the bbc for 
the quality of their production.98 The station has been on air since early 2015 
and offers a wide range of programming including music, language instruc-
tion, and interview shows, interspersed with regular news bulletins and field 
reports from al-Bayan correspondents in Iraq and Syria. While collecting 
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evidence from this source of propaganda is proving somewhat problematic 
due to difficulties in obtaining information, it is still significant for this article. 
As such, this medium of propaganda must be considered alongside the evi-
dence collected from Dābiq as it diminishes the market place of ideas within is 
territory, meaning that any opposing views to the is narrative are silenced, 
with no alternative being disseminated into the social sphere.
5.2 Avoiding the Mistakes in the Media Case
With regard to the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, 
the ictr in the Media case entered unchartered waters, the result of which 
produced a legal precedent on the matter. Due to this influential jurispru-
dence, the starting point for any future analysis of the crime must begin here. 
In order to adequately proceed, it is essential to avoid falling under the same 
criticisms cast upon the judgments in the Media case.99 In order to successfully 
prove is’s culpability of direct and public incitement to commit genocide there 
must be support beyond reasonable doubt to the existence of genocidal intent 
on the part of the perpetrator.100 When coming to this conclusion, the reason-
ing must be based on concrete evidence through unambiguous explanation, 
highlighting which passages meet the threshold for direct and public incite-
ment to commit genocide. While it is beyond the ambit of this article to con-
duct a full analysis of all the material produced by is, an examination of a 
carefully selected set of evidence will be made. However, the prosecution is 
advised to draw their conclusions from a wide and extensive variety of 
evidence.
Kangura, the pre-war weekly tabloid published by Hassan Ngeze, had a cir-
culation of 1500 and 3000. Of the 59 issues produced, 13 passages of a few lines 
each formed the basis of Ngeze’s conviction by the ictr.101 The conviction of 
Nahimana and Baraygwiza was similarly based on 37 excerpts out of several 
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hundred tape recordings running to several thousand transcript pages.102 
Within this large body of evidence, the ictr relied on a relatively small amount 
of discourse and refrained from drawing connections between certain broad-
casts, which appeared essential for their interpretation.103 In order to establish 
incitement to commit genocide an extensive analysis of the vast array of is 
discourse must be undertaken, both individually and collectively. This analysis 
shall highlight exactly which statements amount to direct and public incite-
ment to commit genocide, a requisite of proving said crime.104
The crime itself is unique in the sense that it embodies the intertwinement 
of law and linguistics, yet this poses certain challenges. The ictr were faced 
with the strenuous task of understanding Kinyarwanda. However none of the 
judges and very few of the main lawyers in the prosecution and defence teams 
spoke the language.105 Alexander Zahar argues the Tribunal was thinking in 
English semantics rather than Kinyarwanda semantics.106 The issue here is 
that the crux of establishing the direct element of incitement to commit geno-
cide relies on whether the intended audience perceived the implications of the 
discourse. The failure of such a finding may arise when thinking in English 
semantics as culture and tradition affect intercultural communication, thus 
adding ambiguity to linguistic interpretation.107 Whilst the Kinyarwanda lan-
guage is somewhat harder to interpret than the Islamic references, posing con-
siderably more challenging communicational problems, it is nevertheless a 
lesson which must be duly noted when conducting future trials. In terms of 
translating the discourse from Arabic to English there is little issue. The funda-
mental concern lies in the various Islamic interpretations of key terms used 
throughout the is narrative (for an example see discussion on ‘Dābiq’ above). 
Understanding the key terms in their correct context is essential in order to 
provide sustainable evidence for the conviction of the perpetrators of is. 
Whilst many of the passages cited in their propaganda may be aggressive, vile 
and laced with ethnic hatred they may not unambiguously call for the incite-
ment of genocide. However, when analysed collectively with speech acts pos-
sessing inciting characteristics, this may help in understanding how the 
audience perceived the discourse.
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It must be noted that no prosecution for incitement to genocide to date has 
relied on evidence that the speech caused thousands of deaths: only evidence 
that the speech was made, juxtaposed with separate evidence of mass violence 
afterward, or opinions from witnesses who heard or read the speech and sur-
mised that it had influenced other people to kill on a fearsome scale.108 Whilst 
the general consensus of legal opinion agrees that the crime of direct and pub-
lic incitement to commit genocide is an inchoate offence,109 the jurisprudence 
of the ictr has seen an ambiguous approach in relation to the role of causa-
tion. This ambiguity provoked the question as to whether such reliance on the 
causality element in the ictr jurisprudence has elevated it to a constituent 
element of the crime.110 This is in spite of the fact that such an elevation would 
contradict a century of criminal law on the matter. Regardless of this, in the 
Media case the ictr asserted on 16 occasions that speech acts directly caused 
genocidal killings without any legal requirement to discuss a causal nexus.111 
Several reasons have been put forth to establish why judicial rulings have 
placed reliance on the causal nexus, all of which stem from defining incitement 
to genocide as a crime in the developing body of international criminal law. 
The most prominent identifies causation as a stand in tool for a lack of a sys-
tematic method of proving the dolus specialis to eliminate a protected group, as 
such in whole or in part.112 Thus, to avoid falling into this causal trap the estab-
lishment of the high threshold mens rea must be taken on a case by case basis.
When analysing the evidence from the propaganda of is, this article shall be 
careful not to rely on a causal nexus in an attempt to prove the specific intent 
in situations where it may be lacking. However, it is important to acknowledge 
the fact that genocide is occurring in tandem with the release of propaganda. 
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Thus, conceiving such lexis in light of this distinct ideology may bridge the gap 
between the utterance of the speech act, and the internal world of the indi-
vidual mind where the manifestation of genocidal intent resides. The central 
premise of such reasoning is based on the idea that the cognitive, linguistic 
and, most importantly, legal concept of intent relies on the intentional use of 
the specific utterances by the perpetrator. Through identification of this inten-
tional use, the cognitive desire to bring about the constituent parts of a geno-
cidal plan and policy may be revealed. In order to understand the implications 
contained within the Islamic discourse used by is the following section pro-
vides clarification of the ideology to which is adhere.
6  The Religious Philosophy of Jihādī-Salafism and Its Influence on 
is’s Practice of Takfīr (Excommunication)
The international milieu of jihādī-Salafism has relatively influenced the jihādī 
campaign of is. Jihādī-Salafism is defined as:
The ideology of al-Qaida and likeminded movements, mixing Wahhabi-
inspired Sunni fundamentalism (Salafism) with a revolutionary program 
of overthrowing unjust and un-Islamic regimes in the Muslim world, as 
well as irredentism aiming at expelling non-Muslim military presence 
and influences from Muslim lands.113
The term Salafism derives from the expression al-salaf al-sālih (the pious 
ancestors) and is a branch of Islamic revivalism.114 Both jihādī-Salafīs and the 
non-violent Salafīs adhere strictly to absolute monotheism (tawhīd).115 The 
Salafist dimension of is theology stems from their cemented belief that their 
practice of Islam is more puritan and more rigorous than any other Muslims, 
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so much in fact that their view is the only authentic interpretation. Unlike the 
majority of the Salafī community who advocate non-violent methods of prop-
agation, purification and education, jihādī-Salafist consider ‘jihād as a manhaj 
[methodology] to establish al-dawlatuh al-Islāmiyyah [Islamic state]’.116
Salafists principally target Muslims for corrupting the faith with beliefs and 
practices that violate the oneness of God. Any kind of innovation (bid‘a), be it 
celebrating the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, commiserating the death of 
a saint, or applying tenets of democracy, is unacceptable to God and dangerous 
to Islamic faith. Salafist believes that true Islam is found in the teachings and 
understanding of religious texts provided in words and deeds by the first three 
generations of Islam, namely the sahabah (Companions), al-tabi‘un (follow-
ers) and tabi‘ al-tabi‘un (the one who came after the followers).117
The fundamental tenets which are central to Salafism and thus, lay at the 
core of the is ideology are: the call to return to the authentic practices and 
beliefs of the first generation of Muslims (al-salaf al-sālih); the need to dimin-
ish unbelief; the sole belief that the Qur’ān and Sunna are the only valid sources 
of religious authority; the imperative to rid Islam of heretical inventions (bid‘a); 
and the belief that specific answers to all conceivable questions are found in 
the Qur’ān and Sunna.118
On the other hand, the jihādī-Salafism ideology is built upon Islamic reli-
gious principles, which it distorts to produce a single-minded focus on violent 
jihād.119 Adamant in their radical call for the revival of the authentic Muslim 
society, their objectives compose two tiers; religious and political. They aim to 
eliminate shirk (polytheism) through their ultraconservative jihadist school of 
thought which seeks to eradicate any other religious group who do not follow 
their strict interpretation of Islam.120
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It is this puritanical dedication to the Salafī121 character of the jihādī move-
ment which fronts is narrative through their obsession with doctrinal purity 
and the notion of takfīr (excommunication).122 They openly declare anyone, 
Muslim or non-Muslim, an apostate (someone who has abandoned Islam), 
rendering them susceptible to lawful killing. is adhere to the strict literalist 
interpretation of texts of the Qur’ān and the sayings of the Prophet while privi-
leging militant jihād as a means for implementing their austere, intolerant and 
muscular vision of Islam.123 The theological backbone of is belief system is 
composed of an uncompromising devotion to the Salafist doctrine which is 
enforced through the concept of takfīr and jihād.
The ideology of is also draws a great deal from a fundamentalist 18th century 
religious doctrine Wahhabiyya, founded by Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab 
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(1703–1791).124 The Wahhabi version of Islam imposes Sharī‘a, relegates women 
to the status of second-class citizens. and regards non-Muslims and Shi‘a as 
heretics who should be persecuted. Whilst the common beliefs of the two are 
carried to a greater extreme by is, their ideologies are not exactly the same. 
The anti-Shi‘a Wahhabi view that Shi‘ism is heresy can be traced back to the 
origins of Saudi Arabia’s alliance between Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab 
and Muhammad Ibn Sa‘ud (d.1765), the chief of the Saudi family dating from 
the eighteenth century.125 While the religious intolerance, political authoritari-
anism and readiness to use violence are but some of the characteristics which 
the Wahhabi ideology and is share, it is the latter’s devout adherence to the 
practice of takfīr which is severely exacerbated. Thus, it is important to recog-
nise the influence of the Wahhabiyya doctrine which fuels not just is, but 
much Sunni hatred towards other religious sects, specifically the Shi‘a.
Through analysis of their religious discourse, it becomes obvious that the 
atrocities they commit amount to more than just mindless killing. Rather, this 
discourse provides evidence of an on-going policy that aims to suppress, per-
manently expel, or destroy many minority communities within areas of their 
control.126 Consequently, one can reasonably conclude that their propaganda 
is utilised in order to bring about their strategic objectives, that is, to eradicate 
anyone who does not conform to their radical beliefs. The lexis used by is 
offers a unique platform to establish the intent of the propagandist as they 
adhere to an extremely selective interpretation of Islam. Conducting an analy-
sis in light of this ideologically selective context shall provide an evidentiary 
insight into their genocidal intent.
7 Identifying the Self-declared Islamic State Hate Speech
The hate speech utilised by is forms part of a three-dimensional process with 
each point equally reliant on the other in order to achieve the required out-
come of the perpetrator. The first is extreme negative stereotyping, combined 
with threat and fear mongering, which leads to the advocacy of an elimination 
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policy of the threat posed by the dehumanized subject.127 The latter finds its 
moral justification and mass support through the former. Therefore, in order to 
provide evidence that incitement to commit genocide is being perpetrated by 
is, the cognitive process of advancing a policy through hate discourse must 
first be identified. In order to do this a content analysis of the verbal and visual 
techniques conducted by is must be made. This process has become a hall-
mark of genocide as these common techniques were deployed by both the 
Nazi regime and the Hutu leaders.
7.1 Stereotyping and Generalisation
Stereotyping and generalisation are exceptionally effective mechanisms for 
bringing about the massive participation of the population in mass action as it 
sub-consciously shifts the way in which a minority or a particular group is per-
ceived by the intended audience. They must be dehumanised to such an extent 
that the victim is clearly defined as something less than fully human.128 This in 
effect restores a balance in the principal perpetrators’ morality who, before 
becoming manipulated by propaganda, would not have actively participated 
in the killing of another human. Yet when that human is unequivocally associ-
ated with being evil, verminous and personified in the shape of the devil, will 
actively perpetrate the killing as their moral consciousness has been distorted. 
As such, this technique is a form of moral corruption, seeing a shift in the bal-
ance of morality which falsifies a sense of numbness towards the killing of 
another human being. Killing becomes acceptable whilst the consequences 
appear irrelevant through desensitisation.129
This technique of extreme negative stereotyping is utilised by is in a some-
what more complex and advanced fashion. Unlike the Nazi genocide with its 
at least theoretically manageable target of exterminating the Jewish and other 
minority populations, and the Rwandan genocide focusing only on the Tutsis, 
is makes its target a variety of national, racial, ethnic, and religious groups, 
undoubtedly covering the majority of the world’s population. Within this 
broad spectrum are different groups distinguished by their religion and belief 
(or lack thereof) on the one hand, and the West and its allies on the other. 
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While the groups can overlap,130 is have given each their own derogatory gen-
eralisation, which, although different, all directly equate to the same concept; 
kufr (disbelief in Allah). For the purpose of this article, a common generalisa-
tion of the West and Shi‘a Muslims shall first be analysed before going on to 
discuss the significance of being classified as a kuffar (unbeliever) and its rel-
evance to the groups perpetration of incitement to commit genocide.
7.1.1 The West
In Issue 9 of is’s propaganda magazine we read the following:
We will argue, before Allah, against any Muslim who has the ability to 
shed a single drop of crusader blood but does not do so, whether with an 
explosive device, a bullet, a knife, a car, a rock, or even a boot or a fist. 
Indeed, you saw what a single Muslim did with Canada and its parlia-
ment of shirk, and what our brothers in France, Australia, and Belgium 
did – may Allah have mercy upon them all and reward them with good on 
behalf of Islam. And there were many others who killed, ran others over, 
threatened, frightened, and terrorized people, to the extent that we saw 
the crusader armies deployed on the streets in Australia, Canada, France, 
Belgium, and other strongholds of the cross to whom we promise – by 
Allah’s permission – a continuation of their state of alert, terror, fear, and 
loss of security. And what lies ahead will be worse – with Allah’s permis-
sion – and more bitter, for you haven’t seen anything from us just yet [Say, 
‘Die in Your Rage!’].131
The generalisation cast upon the West alienates them as ‘crusaders’. Through 
reference to and celebration of the terrorist attacks carried out in France, 
Australia and Belgium, all of which involved civilian casualties, is indicates 
that the term ‘Crusader’ encompasses the civilian populations within these 
countries. This term carries historical significance as it refers to a period in his-
tory where Muslims were forced to engage in jihād to defend their lands against 
the invading crusaders. Thus, this key term alienates every single person 
directly associated under the crusader banner, encompassing them within this 
category whilst inciting a hatred grounded in historical context. This provokes 
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religious nostalgia, which collectively resonates with their target audience. 
Civilians in the West, who bear the brunt of any terrorist attacks attributed to 
is, become dehumanised to the extent that they are perceived as a threat to 
Islam (just as the Crusaders were). This negative stereotype appeals to emo-
tions and prejudices in order to catalyse destructive passions and hatred.132 
Furthermore, through the utilisation of the terms ‘Crusader’ and ‘other strong-
holds of the cross’, is unequivocally identifies the West with the Christian reli-
gion, directly associating western people with kufr.
7.1.2 Shi‘a Muslims
The sectarian divide between the Sunni and Shi‘a has long been a part of 
Islamic history. The Wahhabi influence, present in the is ideology, has played a 
vital role in fuelling and aggravating Shi‘a targeted hatred. In Issue 13 of is’s 
propaganda magazine we read:
The religion of Rāfidah (‘Shiism’) was nothing but a plot by a Jew – Ibn 
Saba’ – following the footsteps of his Jewish predecessor Paul, who had 
corrupted the pure religion of the Messiah.133
The closer the Hour approaches, the more the Rāfidah fall in line with 
the Jews in preparation for the appearance of this awaited evil leader. 
Upon reading the Rāfidī account of the ‘Mahdī,’ it becomes clear that he 
is none other than the Dajjāl.134
The Rāfidah are the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the scor-
pion of deception and malice, the prowling enemy, the deadly poison.135
The above passages identify the Shi‘a as the Rāfidah, claiming that the Shiite 
Messiah ‘Mahdi’ is the Dajjāl, an antichrist figure in Muslim eschatology, and 
depicting Shi‘a Muslims as devil worshipers. This directly coincides with the 
cleverly selected term Rāfidah/Rafidi, included twice in the above passage, 
which translates as ‘rejecter’, ‘those who reject, or ‘those who refuse’136 and 
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further enhances is claim that the Shi‘a are guilty of apostasy (the conscious 
abandonment of Islam). Ultimately, this generalisation depicts every Shi‘a 
Muslim as someone who rejects the true tenets of Islam, supports the devil and 
fundamentally distinguishes them from the Sunni Muslim supporters of is. 
The severity of such distinctive generalisations stems from their ability to 
intensify existing antagonisms.
The Wahhabiyya doctrine, which is taking over mainstream Sunni Islam, 
denounces Shi‘a for their faith, and makes them subject to persecution with the 
Jews. This has resulted in a vicious increase in sectarian violence between Sunni 
and Shi‘a and was further intensified after the us invasion of Iraq in 2003 which 
was followed by the accession of a Shi‘a led government. For instance, at the 
hands of Nouri al-Maliki, Shi‘a militia took to the streets of Baghdad and other 
cities with significant Shi‘a populations and committed massacres of Sunnis. 
Intensifying this sectarian divide has long been part of is’s founding father, Abu 
Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi’s strategic plan for success.137 Within the last decade, polls 
have found that at least 40% of Sunni Muslims from five Middle Eastern and 
North African countries did not recognise the Shi‘a as true Muslims.138
The Iraqi army, regardless of opposing Mosul’s invaders, were viewed as an 
Iranian- backed, Shi’ite army led by Iraq’s prime minister. Shi‘a aimed hate pro-
paganda, utilised by is, works to catalyse the underlying hatred possessed by 
many Sunni Muslims, exacerbating the intensity of this hatred through a sec-
tarian dynamic. Exploiting this collective sectarianist view allowed is to ally 
itself with seven or eight Sunni militant groups with which it had previously 
been fighting.139 Thus, this degree of demonization not only awakens, but fuels 
sentiments from dislike and animosity to passions of hatred, while at the same 
time working to unify Sunni Muslim communities.140
7.1.3 Kuffar
In Issue 1 of is’s propaganda magazine we read:
The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr (disbelief) and hypoc-
risy – the camp of the Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere, and the 
camp of the Jews, the crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the 
nations and religions of kufr, all being led by America and Russia.141
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142 Ibid., 47; See also is Magazine, Issue 12, ‘Just Terror’, supra note 95, which spins terrorism 
in the language of a fairy story, referring to terrorists as ‘knights,’ acting to defend Muslim 
honour.
143 is Magazine, Issue 6, ‘Al-Qa’idah of Waziristan: A Testimony From Within’, supra note 95. 
‘This month, an attack was carried out in Sydney by Man Haron Monis, a Muslim who 
resolved to join the mujāhidīn of the Islamic State in their war against the crusader coali-
tion. He did not do so by undertaking the journey to the lands of the Khilāfah and fighting 
side-by-side with his brothers but rather, by acting alone and striking the kuffār where it 
would hurt them most – in their own lands and on the very streets that they presump-
tively walk in safety’. This passage highlights the conjunction of the West as the crusader, 
and the enemy as a whole – the Kuffar – unifying them as one.
144 Surprisingly, this dichotomous classification is profoundly un-Qur’ānic. It seems that this 
dichotomous classification embraced by is and other Islamist movements and groups, is 
a product of a juristic ijtīhād (exertion of intellectual reasoning in understanding laws) 
mainly based on the attitude of the Muslim state towards its enemies and friends during 
the second Islamic century. Because it is beyond the scope and capacity of this article to 
cite and then evaluate all the classical and modern definitions of dār al-Islām and dār 
al-ḥarb, it is helpful to mention Haykal’s definition of dār al-Islām: ‘The country where 
the dominant ruling system is the Muslim rule. At the same time, the internal and exter-
nal security systems are in the hands of Muslims even if non-Muslims help them to estab-
lish this security as long as their help is restricted to the minimal level.’ M Haykal, 1 
Al-Jihād wa al-Qitāl fī al-Siyāsah al-Sharʽiyyah (3rd. ed., Dār al-Bayāriq, Beirut), 669.
145 According to Haykal, dār al-ḥarb or dār al-kufr is: ‘The country that is not governed by the 
Muslim rule even though its (internal and external) security is in their hands. Or it is 
governed by Muslim rule but its security is not in their hands. Or neither its rule nor its 
security is in the hands of Islam and Muslims.’ Ibid, 677. See also M Parvin and M Sommer, 
‘Dar al-Islam: The Evolution of Muslim Territoriality and Its Implications for Conflict 
Resolution in the Middle East’, (1980) 11(1) International Journal of Middle East Studies 
1–21, at 3; A Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave 
The above passage encompasses the overarching view of is; the world is sepa-
rated into two distinct categories. The first are the Muslims aligned with is, 
referred to in the above passage as the mujahidin. This term romanticises the 
actions of is, glorifying their brutality while depicting their members as the 
knights who are going to restore Islam to the golden age of the Prophet 
Muhammad.142 On the other hand, is see the West and their allies (Crusaders), 
and the rest of the nations and religions (Shi‘a as well as the Yazidi, Christians, 
etc.) encompassed under the banner of kufr.143 This is a view which can be 
traced back to classical Islam where Muslims viewed the world as being sepa-
rated into two camps: the dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) and the dar al-harb 
(abode of war).144 The basic status of relations between the two abodes is one 
of war and permanent non-recognition.145 This view of perpetual war presents 
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Crisis: An Inquiry into Boko Haram Ideology and Practices from an Islamic Law 
Perspective’, 3 International Human Rights Law Review (2014) 29–60.
146 Mashood A. Baderin, ‘The Evolution of Islamic Law of Nations and the Modern 
International Order: Universal Peace through Mutuality and Co-operation’, 17 American 
Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (2000) 57, 67.
147 This view is emphasized throughout is magazine. See is Magazine, Issue 1 ‘The Return of 
Khilafah’; Issue 2, ‘The Flood’; Issue 3, ‘A Call to Hijrah’; Issue 8, ‘From Hypocrisy to 
Apostasy’ supra note 95.
148 El-Badawy et al., supra note 87.
a religious obligation through aggressive jihād, legally justified by Muslim 
jurists, which formed the normal condition of the Islamic State’s relations with 
its rivals.146 Thus, the identification of the dar al-harb endorses the use of force 
until all those opposing is fall under the swath of their Islamic belief or are 
killed.147 is have implemented an all-or-nothing distinction between them-
selves and their enemies, all of which have specific derogatory terms which 
fundamentally equate to the same generalisation; they fall outside the realms 
of Islam and as such are classed as a kuffar. Their status as an equal human 
being is diminished as they are directly associated with the notion of unbelief, 
a term which holds grave significance in Islamic history. This has long been 
used as a religious justification to carry out the perpetration of murder against 
this ‘representative class’. As such, the technique is utilised by is to desensitise 
its audience through cognitive activation of subconscious hatred.
7.2 Testimonial and Vox populi, Vox dei
In order to trigger a shift in cognitive perception, the dehumanising generalisa-
tions mentioned above must be implemented alongside a legitimate justifica-
tion in order to be distilled into the mind of the audience. The testimonial 
aspect of this approach can be seen through is’s explicit use of religious justi-
fication for their actions. The Centre on Religion & Geopolitics has analysed a 
cross-section of 114 propaganda sources ranging from April 2013 to summer 
2015 from is, Jabhat al-Nusra, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.148 
Altogether, justification taken from the Qur’ān, hadīth or from scholarship 
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150 is Magazine, Issue 11, p. 20, supra note 95. See also is Magazine, Issue 7, p. 20, supra note 95.
151 is Magazine, Issue 9, pp. 50–59, supra note 95.
152 is Magazine, Issue 3, supra note 95.
153 See the editorial section titled ‘Extinction of the Grayzone’, is Magazine, Issue 7, supra 
note 95, which explicitly talks about is trying to eliminate the ‘gray zone of coexistence’.
appear in 87 per cent of the propaganda. One is statement contained 24 refer-
ences to the Qur’ān, making up 26 per cent of the entire statement. Of these 24 
references, 13 different surahs (chapters) were referenced.149
All thirteen publications of Dābiq are heavily laced with reference to the 
Qur’ān and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. This is ultimately per-
suasive as it portrays the dehumanising stereotypes in a position of divine 
truth, thus placing their audience in a position that to deny the claims would 
be to deny the teachings of Allah. As such, is use Qur’ānic exegeses to fortify 
their rallying narrative:
Shaykh Abū Mus’ab az-Zarqāwī stated, ‘We perform jihād so that Allah’s 
word becomes supreme and the religion becomes completely for Allah. 
{And fight them until there is no fitnah and [until] the religion, all of it, is 
for Allah} [Al-Anfāl: 39]. Everyone who opposes this goal or stands in the 
path of this goal is an enemy to us and a target for our swords, whatever 
his name may be and whatever his lineage may be’.150
Islam is the religion of war. Your Prophet (sallallahu ‘alayhi wa sallam) 
was dispatched with the sword as a mercy to the creation. He was ordered 
with war until Allah is worshipped alone.151
This implementation of hate propaganda is further enhanced through the vox 
populi, vox dei technique which is utilises through their good vs. evil paradigm. 
One of the main threads throughout Dābiq is the theory of ‘us and them’. This 
forms a rallying call that the true followers of Islam will perform hijrah (migra-
tion) to the Islamic Caliphate to support the fundamental concepts of the ide-
ology both physically and mentally.152 This portrays an image to those 
considering joining is that, by refusing to join, they are not only going against 
the word of God, but against the general consensus of the true practitioners of 
the faith. Therefore, their hate discourse infiltrates the mind of their audience 
through positive reinforcement, a strength in numbers argument that auto-
matically resonates with the human brain. The good vs. evil image, embedded 
within religious doctrine and bolstered by the certainty of ideology, allows 
for no middle ground (grey zone),153 with the binary necessitating that the 
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opponents are followers of evil, the result of which justifies the shift in moral-
ity when apprehending hate discourse.154
7.3 Packaged Persuasion: Repetition, Falsehood and Lies
Propaganda reinforcement, by means of repetition and the concealment of 
alternative or contrary messages, allows for the ideals of the propagandist to 
become distilled into the subconscious mind of the audience. The longer this 
process is allowed to go on the further the messages are reinforced, whilst the 
absence of the contrary enhances the influence the propagandist holds. The 
result of which sees the normal thought process of the subject overridden with 
callous thought as the implanted ideas become compounded and crystallised 
in their cerebral cortex.155
Through falsehood and lies the target is characterised as an extreme threat 
to the survival and well-being of one’s own ethnic group, nationality or 
nation.156 The falsification of information can appear in a number of guises, be 
it an outright lie about a certain group to the omission of facts, mischaracteri-
sation of events or fabrications of the truth.157 This is by far the most effective 
method of manipulation and is what transforms communication into propa-
ganda. This arises due to the illegitimate fear factor it creates, arousing the 
need and creating public demand for an active response to reduce the threat.158 
Nazi leader Hermann Goering explained the power of fear to motivate a per-
son to take positive preventative action: ‘The people can always be brought to 
do the bidding of the leader. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are 
being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing 
the country to great danger’.159
is utilises this method in a number of ways to spread fear and hatred 
amongst their audience. This deliberate creation of dread is what distinguishes 
terrorism from simple murderous acts. In an attempt to appeal to members in 
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the Middle East, is exploit extremely graphic photographs throughout Dābiq 
of obliterated towns and villages as well as dismembered bodies of civilians, 
mainly women and children, which it claims are a result of the Coalition led 
airstrikes. is uses this to their advantage in a direct attempt to rally its mem-
bers into action through a collective hatred against the West. This places them 
in a position of Heroism, whilst providing a common enemy who threaten 
their survival. This can be seen in the falsification stemming from the claim 
that the ‘Crusaders are at war with Islam and Muslims’.160 Such an allegation 
works as a ploy to encompass all Muslims under that banner of being victims, 
subject to western persecution.
More explicit forms of falsehood can be seen in their depiction of Shi‘a 
Muslims. is argue that the Shi‘a also pose a fundamental threat to the survival 
of Islam:
The Tābi’ī ash-Sha’bīr (died 104ah) said, ‘I warn you against the followers 
of deviant desires. And the worst of them are the Rāfidah, as they are the 
Jews of this Ummah. Some of them are Jews who fake Islam to spread 
their deviance, just as Paul of the Jews faked Christianity to spread his 
deviance, hoping the Jews would become victorious. The Rāfidah hate 
Islam just as the Jews hate Christianity. They did not enter Islam longing 
for Allah or fearing Him, rather out of spite for the people of Islam and so 
as to inflict harm upon them. Their prayers do not exceed their ears. 
Indeed, ‘Alī burned them alive and banished them to other lands. 
Amongst them was ‘Abdullāh Ibn Saba’, a Jew from the Jews of Sanaa, 
who was banished to Sābāt.161
The above passages use Islamic scholarship to advance the is claim that the 
rafidah (Shi‘a in this case) are deviants, the Jews of the Muslim community 
(ummah) who fake their belief in Islam in order to inflict harm upon the reli-
gion. What is fundamentally important to note here is the subliminal messag-
ing within the above passage. In an extremely clever attempt to reach out not 
just to Muslims within the Middle East and the West, but to non-Muslims, 
through reference to Christianity and the Jews, is are utilising the fact they 
attract an extremely large group of foreign fighters, some of which are not of 
the Islamic faith. This directly resonates with both their Muslim and non- 
Muslim followers, creating a collective hatred out of fabrications and lies.
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Spreading notions of fear and distrust ultimately creates a threat, framed in 
ethnic and sectarian hatred, which requires a solution to a problem, one in 
which is have the answer. The passage below shows how is falsifies claims of 
the Shi‘a and the Crusader West, thus providing evidence how they divide their 
enemies but fundamentally group them together:
The Rāfidah were behind the early fitna during the reigns of ‘Uthmān, 
‘Alī, and Mu’āwiyah. The Rāfidah were behind the death of al-Husayn. 
The Rāfidah waged war against the ‘Abbāsī Khilāfah via the so-called 
‘Fātimī’ state. They supported the Mongols against the ‘Abbāsī Khulafā’ 
and the Muslim kings thereafter. They supported the Franks and the 
Crusaders in their invasions of Shām and Palestine. They waged war 
against Ahlus-Sunnah through the Safawī state. They aided the Americans 
in their invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. They supported the Nusayrī 
regime in Shām and established a Rāfidī militia-state in Yemen. They will 
continue to wage war against the Muslims until the Rāfidah ultimately 
unite with the Jews under the banner of the Dajjāl.162
Through evidence of these six techniques (discussed above), is have and con-
tinue to implement a widespread and systematic policy of inciting hatred 
towards the West, its allies and all other ethnic, racial and religious groups 
not adhering to their puritanical vision of Islam. Through their identification 
of kufr they have created an all or nothing distinction. This has provided rea-
sonable grounds to believe they have created an atmosphere so poisonous, 
that it enables speech acts inciting genocide to flourish in a catalytic manner 
similar to how oxygen can catalyse a forest fire. Drawing on historical, ideo-
logical, political and social factors, is have utilised a broad spectrum of hatred 
in a direct attempt to fuel the destruction, in whole or in part, of several 
national, ethnical, racial or religious groups. This process has already seen 
18,000 deaths in Iraq alone. This article has highlighted the pivotal role hate 
speech plays as a prerequisite of incitement to commit genocide, and has 
thus provided evidence of is’s utilisation of the technique. In order to pro-
ceed, the focus shall turn on passages taken from Dābiq which shows evi-
dence of the unambiguous perpetration of direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide.
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8 The Final Piece of the Puzzle: Proving Incitement
Over the course of the last 17 months, the self-declared Islamic State’s rise to 
power has seen the establishment of the so called caliphate, the recruitment of 
thousands of foreign fighters and the deaths of countless men, women and 
children. In conjunction with their military and ideological impetus, the inter-
national community has been plagued with their digital propaganda, which 
reveals more and more about the motives fuelling their actions as each publi-
cation is released. Whilst a theme of hatred, aimed at their kuffar enemy has 
underpinned each publication, the call to take direct action has been masked 
by euphemistical, metaphorical and subliminally religious discourse. However, 
on 20 January 2016, the release of the 13th Issue of Dābiq provided sufficient 
evidence of an unambiguous call to directly and publicly incite their audience 
to commit genocide. While is encompass a wide array of religious, ethnic and 
national groups under the banner of kufr, the following section shall specifi-
cally focus on the direct and public incitement to commit genocide against the 
Shi‘a population as a whole. The following conclusive evidence is taken from 
Dābiq, Issue 13 – ‘The Rafidah: From Ibn Saba to the Dajjal’, pages 32–45 which 
are solely dedicated to delegitimising the history of Shiite Islam, providing a 
vast amount of content to justify their call to eradicate the religious sect.
8.1 Actus Reus: Is the Direct Element Satisfied?
If you can kill a disbelieving American or European – especially the spiteful 
and filthy French – or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever 
from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries 
that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State …kill the disbeliever 
whether he is civilian or military, for they have the same ruling.163
It is not possible for the Muslims to achieve victory against the hostile 
kuffār from the Jews and Christians except by abolishing those apostate 
agents – especially the Rāfidah.164
Thus, the Rāfidah are mushrik apostates who must be killed wherever 
they are to be found, until no Rāfidī walks on the face of earth, even if the 
jihād claimants despise such and even if the jihād claimants defend the 
Rāfidah with their words day and night. The Rāfidah and their founder Ibn 
Saba’ hated the khulafā’ of the Muslims, spread strife amongst their ranks, 
encouraged dissent, and waged war against the historic khilāfah all in the 
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name of ‘commanding the good and forbidding the evil,’ a trait the jihād 
claimants also share with the Rāfidah. It is therefore not surprising that the 
jihād claimants now wage war against the Islamic State while condemning 
the targeting of Rāfidī temples, markets, and neighbourhoods.165
The purpose of the first passage, taken from Dābiq Issue 1, is to highlight the 
difference in lexis used in the earlier publications compared to the later publi-
cations, seen in the latter two passages. One must pay specific attention to the 
term ‘if you can’ in the first passage, which must be considered in light of the 
fact that is had only just established their caliphate, produced little in terms of 
online propaganda, and were relatively unknown to those residing outside the 
Middle East. As such, the discourse merely provides an inference, placing the 
nexus to carry out a murderous act, in the hands of the audience. This is imple-
mented in a situation where hate propaganda has not yet had the chance to 
materialise through the generalisation, testimonial and falsehood and reputa-
tion process, at least not to the extent it has over the course of the last year and 
a half.
However, in the latter two passages there is evidence of a shift in lexical 
emphasis; ‘it is not possible’, ‘except by abolishing the apostate Rafidah’, ‘the 
Rafidah are mushrik apostates who must be killed’, ‘wherever they are found’, 
‘until no Rafidi walks the place of the earth’. The shift in the paradigm of lexi-
con use has gone from mere speculation and inference to absolute urgency, 
providing an outright instruction to take immediate criminal action.
8.2 A Call to Take Immediate Action?
In order to proceed, it must first be asked whether the discourse from the latter 
two passages contain more than a vague or indirect suggestion of incitement, 
which can specifically provoke another to engage in criminal conduct.166 It is 
evident on the facts that the lexis used equates to more than a mere vague sug-
gestion. There is no inference present here, but rather, there is an explicit call 
to take action evidenced through the use of ‘killed’ and ‘abolished’, which is 
defined in the oxford dictionary as ‘to formally put an end to’.167 Highlighting 
the urgent fact that Muslims cannot achieve victory without abolishing the 
Rāfidah reveals that the author(s) of the magazine requires his audience to 
take immediate action. Here the audience is only given one option, before vic-
tory can be achieved, the Shi‘a must be eradicated. Thus an ultimatum is placed 
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upon the audience, kill or fail and be cast as complicit in the destruction of 
Islam. As such, the first and only thing the reader can do is carry out the order 
in which they have been given, the criminal act of committing murder. Using 
the term ‘must be killed’ in juxtaposition with ‘abolish’ and ‘until no Rāfidi 
walks the place of the earth is an explicit call to take immediate action, con-
taining zero ambiguity with regard to its implicational context.
8.3 How Does the Audience Perceive the Speech?
In order to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the direct element of incite-
ment to genocide has been satisfied, the audience must be proven to under-
stand the implications contained within this discourse. The call to take 
immediate action has been identified, what now must be deliberated is against 
whom? To do this it must be analysed whether is target audience directly asso-
ciates the term Rafidah to the Shiite Muslims. Whilst this term would appear 
ambiguous to anyone other than someone aware of the Islamic tradition, the 
Sunni Muslim audience whom is target could perceive it as having parallel 
associations with the Shi‘a. Through collective analysis of the repetitive and 
derogatory hate propaganda utilised by is, it is reasonable to conclude that 
their target audience perceive and equate the term Rāfidah – a long standing 
concept in Islamic tradition – with kufr, the banner in which the Shiite popula-
tion as a whole fall under. As this article has highlighted in the previous sec-
tion, a large majority of Sunni Muslims regard the Shi‘a as not being true 
Muslims, guilty of apostasy as a result of ideological differences. This must also 
be considered alongside the historical sectarian divide between the Sunni and 
Shi‘a, fuelled by the Wahhabi influence, as well as, the political oppression and 
discrimination of Sunni Iraqis which occurred under the regime of Nouri al-
Maliki. Dr Ali Allawi, the historian and authority on sectarianism stated that 
‘Sunni communities have adopted tenets of Wahhabism that were not initially 
part of their canon, with many Shi‘a now living with a sense of impending 
doom like the Jews did in Germany in 1935’.168 As such, the violent Wahhabi 
view of Shi‘a as non-Muslims must be born in mind when analysing how Sunni 
Muslims with whom is resonates perceive the implications of the speech acts 
in question. Therefore, the term Rāfidah possesses the characteristics which, 
when analysed in the light of this cultural, historical, political and ideological 
context, directly equates to the Shi‘a. This occurs in such a detrimental manner 
that the inciting discourse is subconsciously understood as a call to take imme-
diate action, as a broad spectrum of hatred towards the Shi‘a is already ignited 
in the minds of their audience.
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The plethora of religious justification and fabrication of lies throughout the 
mass of is propaganda further enhances this notion. Hate propaganda has 
thus played the role of creating a collective enemy based on underlying and 
already implanted negative stereotypes, backed up by religious justification 
and the fabrication of material facts, through consistent reinforcement of hate 
discourse. As such, there is evidence to suggest beyond reasonable doubt that 
the audience of is would perceive the speech acts above as a direct call to take 
immediate murderous action against Shi‘a Muslims.
8.4  Is the Speaker Able to Influence the Audience and Are the Audience 
Able to Commit Genocide?
To further bolster this claim, a discussion of the voice inherent in making this 
genocidal call to action must be conducted.169 Dābiq is the ‘voice of the caliph-
ate’ in a digital publication format, carrying the divine truth of God, in the 
name of Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who is an apparent descendent of the 
Prophet Muhammad. Explicit justification is provided from the Qur’ān 
throughout the publication along with references to prestigious Islamic schol-
ars such as Abdullāh Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdil-Wahhāb and Ibn Taymiyyah.170 
In addition to this, explicit reference is also made to is founder, Abu Mus‘ab 
al-Zarqawi, whose ideological influence distilled during the group’s embryonic 
stage is what spearheads their rallying narrative now. In light of this informa-
tion, it is reasonable to conclude that a devout Muslim with whom is resonates 
could be heavily influenced by the Islamic discourse embedded in their mes-
sage. This influence partly derives from the divinity attached to the original 
sources of these messages. The vast army aligned with is who control, govern 
and help regulate and extend the so-called caliphate (spanning a territory 
larger than that of the uk) proves they have the ability to carry out genocide. 
Evidence of this could be seen in June 2014 when they captured the city of 
Mosul which at the time was being protected by the Iraqi Security Forces (isf).
8.5 Have the Shi‘a Muslims Suffered Recent Violence?
The Shi‘a have been subject to widespread and systematic violence, consis-
tently targeting Shi‘a civilians and places of religious and cultural significance 
to the group.171 This continuum of violence has long been part of the status 
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quo in the Middle East, yet this meticulous persecution has been exacerbated 
by the rise of is. The on-going brutal violence experienced by the Shi‘a has 
seen the beheadings of persons of religious importance, the destruction of 
ancient cultural heritage sites; the city of Palmyra, countless civilian execu-
tions,172 and the explicit targeting of Shi‘a mosques.173 In light of this, there are 
grounds beyond reasonable doubt to believe that the audience of is’s poison-
ous inciting speech would apprehend the discourse in a much more danger-
ous light; a context in which preceding hate speech and violence has 
desensitized its audience and has blunted the audience’s opposition towards 
carrying out murder, thereby forming the customary norm of behaviour for 
the subject.
8.6 Actus Reus: Is The Public Element Satisfied?
This element of the crime is relatively self-evident, requiring only a brief dis-
cussion on the topic. It is sufficient to say that the propaganda of is; their digi-
tal publication, Dābiq, with its unlimited global reach, their radio station, 
al-Bayan, broadcast over the airwaves in Iraq, Syria and which has now been 
reported in Afghanistan, their audio statements and the distribution of physi-
cal and visual content in the streets and public parks within the so-called 
caliphate, satisfy the public element requiring a call for criminal action to a 
number of individuals in a public place or to members of the public at large by 
such means as mass media.174 The number of people reached by is propa-
ganda and the mediums used to connect with their audience provide evidence 
in support of a finding that the incitement is public.175
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8.7  Mens Rea: Does the Perpetrator Accused of Direct and Public 
Incitement to Commit Genocide Share the Special Intent of the 
Principal Perpetrator?
The ideologically fuelled perpetration of mass murder across Iraq and Syria 
forms part of a widespread and systematic genocidal policy. Unlike the 
Rwandan genocide, the situation involving is does not present a paradigm 
where reliance must be placed on the causal nexus of inciting speech and the 
proceeding act in order to establish the intent of the perpetrator. There is 
strong evidence to reasonably conclude that genocide is in fact occurring in 
the Middle East against the Shi‘a, Yazidi and Christian communities. However, 
this alone does not demonstrate intent and cannot be solely relied upon.176 To 
establish the desire on the part of the perpetrator to create by his actions a 
particular state of mind necessary to commit such a crime in the minds of the 
person(s) he is so engaging, the theological implications of the concept of 
takfīr (excommunication) must be discussed.177 The implications stemming 
from the devout use of the concept arise from its ideological and historical 
dynamic. When analysed in this context, the mechanics of the internal mind 
become externally manifested through linguistics.
The practice of takfīr is an institutional act of religious censure used to 
deprive a Muslim of their Islamic status (excommunication).178 The concept 
consists of declaring a person’s religious ‘belief ’ (iman) as impure, accusing 
them of ‘unbelief ’ kāfir.179 The issue with the free practice of takfīr lies 
solely with its abuse being the object of conscious subjectivism, rendering 
it an extremely dangerous weapon in the hands of those who are attached 
fanatically to their own sect.180 is’s view stipulates that a person deprived 
of their iman has committed a major sin, the punishment of which is lawful 
murder.
This Islamic concept can be traced back 1,400 years, almost as far back as 
Islam itself. The first use of takfir in Islamic history was by a group named 
Khawārij, a religious movement, who rebelled after the battle of Siffin (657 
C.E.) having objected to the Fourth Caliph ‘Ali’s arbitration with Mu‘awiya 
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(founder of the Umayyad Dynasty of the Caliphate; r.661–680).181 The Khawārij 
argued that ‘Ali had followed human judgment, not divine judgment (hukm); 
his action was clearly kufr,182 resulting in the denouncement of his faith.183 The 
Khawārij slogan of la hukm illa li-llah (‘no decision but God’s’ or ‘judgement 
only belongs to Allah’) constituted the foundation of their theology,184 and all 
those admitting the authority of human decisions (hukm) were regarded as 
infidels.185 Thus, extreme emphasis was placed on the divinity of God’s 
Command.186 The concept of takfīr was developed in line with this theology 
and the Khawārij followed a simple principle, namely that anyone committing 
a sin or disobeying God should be condemned as an unbeliever (kāfir)187 and 
as a result, must be cast out from the community. They saw themselves as the 
only true Muslims, branding everyone else, including all other Muslims, as 
unbelievers.188 As a result, killing unbelievers was not a sin.189 The key distinc-
tion in belief was ‘not between Muslim believers and non-Muslim unbelievers, 
but rather between those within the body of Islam who had faith and those 
who did not, even if technically muslimūn [Muslim]’.190 The Khawārij cited a 
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precedent for their actions, namely the murder of the Third Caliph, ‘Uthman. 
This murder had been justified by declaring that ‘Uthman had ‘broken God’s 
law by not inflicting a penalty prescribed in the Qur’ān’,191 and that by breaking 
this law he was by default excluded from the community and his murder by 
any Muslim rendered lawful.192
Thus, through linguistic demonstration of a devout adherence to the prac-
tice of takfīr, evidence of is’s global view that Islam is a manifest path which 
seeks to liberate all of humanity is revealed. The mass killing of the Shi‘a 
Muslims in Iraq and Syria does not form part of an inconsistent or uncoordi-
nated plan. Rather, it forms a widespread and systematic methodology seeking 
to establish the dār al-harb (abode of war) as opposed to those aligned with is 
and adhere to is’s vision of the faith embodied in the so-called caliphate. Those 
falling outside of this vision become subject to eradication. The intent of the 
perpetrator ultimately derives from the unequivocal, intentional use of this 
concept as its theological connotations distinguish between perpetrator and 
victim (kuffar) and why the victims are to be killed; a genocidal policy which 
relies upon liberating Islam as a means to establish the pure Muslim ummah.
Takfīr is explicitly referred to in 27 per cent of is propaganda,193 thus 
cementing the view that the repetitive and intentional use of the concept pro-
vides linguistic evidence that they themselves possess the desire to bring about 
the destruction of the kuffar (in this case, the Shi‘a). The kuffar are depicted as 
forming the predominant obstacle stopping is from achieving their overarch-
ing objective. In their 13th issue of Dābiq, after listing five reasons to justify 
practising takfīr against the Shi‘a, the following statement is made:
The various forms of kufr held and practiced by the Rāfidah are so numer-
ous, especially as they innovate new deviances with every passing day 
while they simultaneously wage war against Islam and support the cru-
saders and apostates against the Muslims.194
The convergence between the direct call to take immediate, murderous action, 
in connection with ideological concepts used to establish and distinguish 
between victim and perpetrator, ideological justification, whilst revealing the 
perpetrators own intent to achieve perpetration of the criminal act, together 
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represent an example of mens rea indicating a strong presence of genocidal 
intent. As such, linguistic analysis depicts a mental state designed to bring 
about a required outcome. The extremely specific connotations attached to is 
rhetoric ultimately reveal the specific intent required to be guilty of commit-
ting direct and public incitement to commit genocide.
9 Conclusion
The self-declared Islamic State propaganda is widespread and systematic, 
relentless and meticulous, utilising a vast array of mediums with an ability to 
reach a global audience. Its official digital magazine is published monthly and is 
currently on its 13th issue. In addition to this, they produce prominent releases 
through their central propaganda video production branches; the al-I’tiṣām, 
al-Furqān Foundations, and the al-Ḥayāt Media Centre.195 is also produces daily 
radio and text bulletins, photographic essays and videos alongside official audio 
statements from senior members of the group, including the so-called ‘Caliph’ 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and official spokesperson Abu Mohammad al-Adnani. 
Moreover, is made a very good use of poetry, given the specific cultural and 
symbolic significance of poetry for many Arabic speakers.196
In Iraq and Syria it is known that is control several television stations as well 
as controlling their own radio station Al-Bayan. Recent evidence from inter-
views with citizens living in is territory has shown they have an extensive 
internal operation dedicated to distributing Arabic propaganda in the form of 
dvds of official statements and hard copies of its writings as well as showing 
their latest propaganda videos on big screens in public parks.197 Also in Kabul, 
it has been reported that is are transmitting hours of extremist propaganda 
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carrying ‘revolutionary propaganda and fatwas’ calling for followers to kill any-
one who stands in their way;198 a country where radio is considered the most 
powerful form of mass media.199
is propaganda makes up the majority of content circulated in areas within 
their control. Whilst it is impossible to achieve this global exposure through 
the medium of mass media, the organisation’s committed supporters from 
around the world provide a wealth of material, forever geared towards spread-
ing the is narrative. In terms of mass media content produced by is, there is 
little opposition which stands up to refute their message or matches the quality 
of their production and circulation. Thus it would appear that the propaganda 
is sufficiently repetitive in an environment where the marketplace of ideas is 
either disabled (places under is control), or in an environment where their 
message is met with little opposition (global media), causing the audience to 
be persuaded that the message they are perceiving is the divine truth. This is 
verified by the array of attacks directed by, linked to or inspired by is which 
have occurred since the establishment of the so-called caliphate and their pro-
fessional media outputs. The international community has been victim to 
attacks in Paris, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Turkey, Australia, California, 
Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Lebanon, Pennsylvania, Kuwait, Texas, 
Afghanistan, Denmark, New York, Algeria,200 and most recently the attacks in 
Brussels not to mention the thousands of deaths in Iraq and Syria.
Through collective analysis, one can reasonably arrive at the conclusion that 
is are responsible of committing the crime of direct and public incitement of 
others to commit genocide. Through the consistent implementation of hatred 
encompassed within the multi-tiered medium of is propaganda, an environ-
ment of moral distortion, manipulation and indoctrination has been created. 
The use of a derogatory Islamic rhetoric, all of which fundamentally equates to 
the Islamic concept of kufr, while at the same time presenting the kuffar as a 
threat to the very survival of Islam, has enabled is to subtly make the transition 
from inciting hatred to inciting its audience to take immediate criminal action.
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Through distinct propaganda techniques, the disbarment of the market 
place of ideas, and the use of Qur’ānic exegesis to justify their actions, has seen 
the subliminal messages embedded within Dābiq, materialise into physical 
atrocities. Yet, whilst religious discourse has proved to be is’s most persuasive 
body of indoctrination, from a legal point of view, it has been their pivotal 
downfall. is have taken the concept of Islam and used it as its call to arms, 
evolving it into a revolutionary murderous doctrine, painted over with a broad 
brush of theological colour to give it the appearance of legitimacy.201 However, 
through linguistic interpretation, the concept of takfīr which spearheads the 
rallying narrative of is have provided concrete evidence of the dolus specialis 
required to find them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime 
of direct and public incitement to commit genocide.
In order to proceed, an appropriate approach is to take the same course of 
action as the Trial Chamber in the Media case; to treat Dābiq as the perpetrator 
of genocide and convict the defendants by virtue of their relationship to the 
media organ in question.202 At the current time of writing, evidence grows 
stronger to suggest is are committing genocide against not just the Shi‘a, but 
the Yazidi and Christian community also. Social psychologist, Albert Bandura 
identifies that ‘over the centuries much conduct has been perpetrated by ordi-
nary, decent people in the name of righteous ideologies, religious principles 
and national imperatives […] it requires conductive social conditions rather 
than monstrous people to produce heinous deeds’.203 The international com-
munity must now acknowledge that is laid the foundations for the creation of 
such heinous deeds over a year and a half ago, the very foundations which have 
allowed genocidal incitement to override morality, whilst ‘ordinary, decent’ 
people commit murder in the name of Islam.204
